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KANT ON THE THEORETICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE 
ABSTRACT 
Kant's statement limiting the material of cognitive 
categories to the empirical--that which appears to us in the 
manifold of sensible intuition--is examined in its relation 
to the concept of a Thing presumed by definition to be 
nonempirical or transcendent of the empirical, the God of 
modern theism. Kant's limiting statement forbids the appli-
cation of the a priori concepts of understanding, the categories 
of Existence, Causality, and determinate Necessity, in three 
proofs of the existence of a transcendent ens realissimum. 
Rather the application of these categories is limited to 
natural states of affairs in the sections of Kant's Dialectic 
devoted to three traditional arguments for God's existence. 
In what follows the Kantian theory of existence is 
explored in close detail as is Kant's limitation of the 
meaning of causality and necessity. Each proof is given in 
the formulation Kant examined, with reference to the source 
ii 
of that formulation. A sununary of Kant's treatment is then 
set forth and exposed to analysis. 
If Kant's negative criticism of the three proofs under 
examination depends on his limiting statement, then we are 
naturally led to inquire after the logical status of that 
statement and Kant's defense of it. While it is beyond our 
scope to set forth and expound the theoretical foundation of 
Kant's principle of cognitive limit~tion, it becomes clear 
through analysis that that principle fails to limit to 
sensibilia the application of the categories, since that prin-
ciple is itself the knowledge-claim that the category 
Limitation applies to the abstract and nonempirical class of 
all conceptual acts of knowledge. That is, Kant's statement 
qf limitation knows what it professes not to know, that the 
category Limitation has an application outside objects of 
possible experience. 
Thus, if Kant's limitative statement failed as a 
knowledge-claim in the manner indicated, it would appear 
that we need to seek elsewhere for a general epistemological 
principle for the criticism of theistic arguments. 
iii 
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FOREWORD 
Kant's statement and discussion of the traditional 
arguments for God's existence represent the locus classicus 
for contemporary discussion of those arguments. Presuppo-
sitions shared by both Kant's rationalist and empiricist 
predecessors also formed the foundation for Kant's exposition 
of the traditional arguments, in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
In the present discussion we shall: state each argu-
ment as Kant found it in the writings of his modern prede-
cessors; examine Kant's treatment of each argument in light 
of the theoretical constructs of the Critical philosophy 
(but not the practical constructs of that philosophy); and 
examine one of the major or foundational principles of Kant's 
theoretical philosophy. In following this program it is not 
practical to examine the relation of Kant and those who 
influenced him, nor is it expedient except as to discern the 
sources of the arguments with whi ch Kant dealt. This shall 
serve as something of a limitation on the whole. 
A more explicit limitation is that we have found it 
V 
appropriate in consideration of normal expectations as to 
the scope and size of an M.A. thesis to expound only Kant's 
discussion of the three traditional arguments. Gracious and 
helpful advice was given to the effect that the scope of the 
original project--an exposition of many of Kant's views on 
natural and moral theology--was excessive in its expectations, 
no matter how well that project may have succeeded in meeting 
those expectations. Hence, our formal discussion considers 
only Sections 4 through 6 of Kant's (Dialectic) Chapter, 
"The Ideal of Pure Reason". In addition, we consider the 
epistemological basis of Kant's exposition. Of course, it 
could not be helped that some larger considerations, including 
those Kant may have touched on in the Sections surrounding 
those named above, were brought into the argument. However, 
to give a good accounting of how those and other relevant 
Sections of the Critique affect what we have considered here, 
and then in addition to consider the convolutions of Kant's 
moral philosophy and its necessitarian view of God's existence 
and character (with respect to moral philosophy), would fill 
a mammoth treatise on the subject as we may attest from 
experience. 
vi 
In full view of these considerations it became the 
expedient, and, it is hoped, fruitful project of the present 
writer to shorten the scope of the original project. What 
follows is the result of such labors as were necessary in 
order to make the shortened version an integral whole. 
vii 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Even the assumption--as made on behalf of 
the necessary practical employment of my reason--
of God, freedom, and immortality is not permissible 
unless at the same time speculative reason be · 
deprived of its pretensions to transcendental 
insight. For in order to arrive at such insight 
it must make use of principles which, in fact, 
extend only to objects of possible experience, 
and which, if also applied to what cannot he an 
object of experience, always really change this 
into an appearance, thus rendering all practical 
extension of pure reason impossible. I have 
therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, 
in order to make room for faith. 
--Immanuel Kant 
Section I. Epistemological. 
That Kant's general viewpoint about any natural 
theology (that it is epistemologically unwarranted) should 
come before his particularly brilliant discussion of the 
arguments themselves, has led to much confusion. It ought 
2 
therefore to be made clear both that Kant himself believed 
with conviction that there is a God, and that he is convinced 
that, in the context of morality at least, there is no reason 
why others should not share his belief. However, the present 
work under discussion is primarily epistemological, and Kant 
chose to begin his exposition of some attempts to know God 
with the sentence: "We have seen above that no objects can 
be represented through pure concepts of understanding, apart 
f th d ·t · f 'b'l' nl rom econ 1 ions o sensi 1 ity •••. 
Kant's general viewpoint does not entail that there 
is no natural theology. His point is that knowledge about 
these matters escapes us, on the count that knowledge is 
limited by the formation of its concepts to sense experience. 
We are tempted by imagination to try to evade this general 
point by pointing at Kant's own philosophy: Kant, in opposi-
tion to empiricists such as Hume, denies that our mode of 
knowledge arises out of sense experience. For Kant it is 
the knowing mind which, through our concepts (or Categories), 
shapes sense experience so that we may indeed know the 
sensibilia, as for example science knows what it knows. It 
may indeed be stated that Kant's paradigm for knowledge 
3 
makes objects conform to our concepts of them. Kant's 
general epistemology pointed out that it is by giving in to 
such persistent illusion as may be engendered by an episte-
mology of pure and constructive concepts that we attempt to 
exceed the limitations of any theory of knowledge appropriate 
to sensible experience: that very point, i.e. the limitation 
of knowledge, is the substance of Kant's critique of the 
traditional theoretical arguments f or God's existence. 
What confuses the reader is the expectation that that 
limit is all Kant had to say on the subject at hand. Even 
here, however, it is clear from Kant's words that there are 
other considerations relevant to the persistence of the 
illusion of knowledge. For example, a due consideration of 
some circumstance under which we need to decide 2 whether 
there is a God might lead us to conviction in that matter 
under the duress of some such circumstance. Such a convic-
tion could even come about as the result of a consideration 
(such as an argument from natural theology) which by itself 
is insufficient with regard to theoretical objects. This 
circumstance together with one such argument might constrain 
some sort of obligation to believe that God exists. 
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Kant's Chapter is in fact fairly strewn with hints 
such as these, i.e. hints as to Kant's personal convictions 
in connection with the matter at hand. One encounters them 
frequently in a direct examination such as that on which we 
are about to embark. But we can now no more than mention 
them in a hope that they shall not confuse, because they are 
here at large in a territory which is unknown to them, and 
one which becomes explicit, as we said, only in Kant's moral 
philosophy. 
At present we shall concern ourselves ., and be limited 
to, Kant's epistemological limitation as it applies to the 
theoretical arguments for God's existence, leaving the prob-
lem of that limitation for a concluding statement, and leaving 
the background of that limitation in Kant's general episte-
mology to the commentators on Kant's Analytic. It is unfor-
tunate that the hints mentioned above are a surprise to the 
readers of those commentaries, and this is the source of 
much confusion. However, many of the particulars of Kant's 
epistemology are more clearly reflected when concretely 
applied, as is the case in their application to the theistic 
arguments. Hence, it is better that we shall see the 
theoretical limitation (and its consequent demarcation of 
the empirical and the nonempirical) at work and then make 
our evaluation on that basis. 
We shall again mention Kant's introductory Sections 
5 
(1 through 3) only as they serve to anticipate his discussion 
of the particular arguments, and as we come to understand the 
problematic of that limitation of knowledge primarily in the 
context of Kant's discussion of those arguments • .We assume 
the reader's awareness of the context of Kant's main episte-
mological thesis and recent discussion of its shortcomings, 
especiall y , that is, in the area of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. 
Section II. Existence as a Category. 
To begin to disc .uss the ontological argument could 
require us to do what Plantinga 3 did and begin with its first 
formulation by St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). But 
t nat particular formulation, which Plantinga has Kant debating 
in Plantinga's chapter, is not the formulation Kant himself 
treated of, since Kant's Section (4) discussed " ••• the 
famous ontological argument of Descartes 114• So we do not 
need to examine Anselm's formulation except as to note how 
it differs from Descartes'. In our exposition of Kant we 
will shortly examine Descartes' premisses. 
Before doing so we need to establish two principles 
6 
in order to carry out the exposition of Kant's Chapter. 
First, is the general epistemological limitation of Category 
application just discussed. In the case at hand the category 
to be examined is Existence. As mentioned above Kant's 
quite singular attitude is that, since categories may not 
be applied to any knowing except that under the conditions 
of sensibility, and since Existence is a category, we simply 
cannot have any way of knowing (or not knowing) any thing 
exists that is thought to be outside experience. Our lan-
guage, as may be seen from the last clause of our last sen-
tence, finds it difficult to express such a principle. For 
if it is thought to be outside experience, then we are still 
saying something about its existence, namely that we may 
think its existence. Such linguistic perplexity portends 
the philosophical perplexity we shall later encounter in 
Kant's limitation of knowledge. It also presages the thinkable 
existence in Kant's moral philosophy of objects unknowable in 
connection with his theoretical view of our mode of knowledge. 
-
Be this as it may, here we need to remind that Existence 
is not applicable to any knowing outside the conditions of 
sense experience for Kant. 
Second, we must not only remember that Existence is 
7 
a Category for Kant, but that since all three (and any other 
variations) of the proofs are instrumentalities for knowing 
God's existence, and since Kant regarded knowledge of a 
nonsensible entity as impossible under the principles of the 
Analytic, they could not stand as proofs under Kant's parameter 
for knowledge in any way whatsoever. Of course, such a line 
of argument assumes that God is absolutely Other or transcen-
dent of the world. That latter assumption Kant shared with 
his predecessors ana contemporaries, and is a fundamental 
point of departure for the entire discussion of Kant's work 
on t ire subject. Given Kant's epistemology and absolute 
division between the world of appearance, or phenomenal 
world, and the world of things-in-themselves, or noumenal 
world, it should be clear that transcendent theoretical · 
proof is impossible by Kant's theory of knowledge. This is 
not, however, the same as saying that Kant succeeded in the 
destruction of the theistic proofs, or that if he destroyed 
. 
8 
the ontological argument he also destroyed the others (since 
they presuppose ontological necessity), which are together 
the usual points made when discussing Kant's treatment of 
the proofs in general. So we must agree with Bennett 5 , 
Ewing 6 , and Smith 7 that Kant's discussion, in particular his 
critique of the ontological argument, is mainly or firstly 
in coherent agreement with the negative purpose of the 
Dialectic: to remove from transcendental theory all illusion 
transcendent of such theory based on the principles of the 
Analytic. And, although Strawson did not discuss the onto-
logical argument, the other three commentators, at least, 
agree in discerning the Cartesian origin of that argument. 
Hence, Kant's principles are, that the category 
Existence cannot be employed in any knowing outside experience, 
and that since all proofs of God's existence are, as proofs, 
instrumentalities for noncategorial knowing, they cannot be 
accepted under Kant's Analytic paradigm for knowledge. 
Therefore, no matter which of the three words Kant used that 
are translated "existence" by Kemp Smith 8 , the category 
Existence (Dasein) is inappropriately used, for Kant, if the 
transcendental Ideal were to be taken as a referring concept 
-
9 
for the purpose of denoting an object of possible knowledge. 
We may slightly advance our argument if we pause a 
moment more to review Kant's prohibition in the Deduction of 
the Categories (in B), paragraph 22 9 • Both the Section 
title (The Category has no other Application in Knowledge 
than to Objects of Experience) and its conclusion prohibit the 
use of categories in the knowledge of things excepting knowl-
edge within experience. The entire possibility of knowing 
Dasein is related for Kant to the proper use of the categories. 
In that paragraph Kant mentioned that although we may think 
concepts without intuitions, it is not possible to know an 
object without an intuition of that object, and since for 
Aesthetic all intuitions are possible only within 
sense-experience, " ••• the thought of an object in general ••• 
can become knowledge for us only in so far as the [pure] 
. . ,.10 h concept is related to obJects of the senses.... T ere-
fore, " ••• the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, 
have no kind of application, save only in regard to things 
h . h b b ' f · · ,,ll w ic may e o Jects o possible experience. This con-
clusion, Kant held, is of the utmost importance for his 
philosophy 12 
10 
We shall in our next Chapter (on the cosmological 
proof) apply the same technique to the exposition of Kantian 
contingency, necessity and causality, categories all. For 
clear reference hereinafter, we name this technique the 
noumenalist technique, since it forbids the application of 
knowledge to things-in-themselves, or noumena. 
Section III. Existence as a possible Predicate; and the 
application of this technique of exposition. 
Kant began his discussion of the ontological proof by 
re-stating, as a context, the main points of eariier Sections 
of the Chapter on the Ideal of Pure Reason. *Simply because 
reason requires the Ideal [as a contribution to aprioristic 
knowledge of such predicates as unity and necessity], we must 
not assume an objective reality is known to exist correspond-
ing to the Idea1
13
• As the Ideal is required for complete 
predication, a humanly unattainable goal, it is a limiting 
Ideal and does not serve to extend the understanding to a 
knowledge of new objects, but merely serves as a source for 
their possible predicates. 14 * 
*Such marks in the course of our discussion indicate, in a 
manner analogous to quotation marks, areas wherein Kant's 
views are summarized for the purpose of comment. They are 
used in this manner throughout. 
11 
We pause here only to note that the latter use of 
'predicates' may be of help when trying to ~nderstand Kant's 
doctrine of synthetic predication, and the use of that doc-
trine in the present Chapter. Even predication, when what 
is predicated is a Category, is restricted by Kant to the 
conditions of sensibility for knowledge of the predication, 
since any employment of categories is so restricted for Kant. 
Thus in the above surmnary sentence is a sample of Kant's 
ordinary usage of the word, as restricting itself to empirical 
predication. One may further observe that beyond Kant's 
restrictive use of the Categories, or in addition to that 
restriction, a positive use has been added in the function 
of the transcendental Ideal, a use which represents the 
basic purpose of the category. This positive use is for 
theoretical predication, in that each category plays its 
part in theoretical knowledge. But the source of such 
predicates as are demanded by positive knowledge is the 
transcendental Ideal, the hypostatization of which into a 
real and knowable object is the dangerous illusion. We shall 
presently examine Kant's illusion as it applies to the 
positive predication of the category Existence. 
-
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Section IV. Existence as an analytic predicate. 
Twice in the general discussion of the Ideal Kant had 
compared the ens realissimum (i.e. the inference from the 
t d t 1 Id 1 t th t 1 B . ) t 11 . 15 ranscen en a ea o e mos rea eing o a sy ogism , 
in respect of the necessity of each. In the first case 16 
Kant held that the Ideal of the sum-total of possible predi-
cates is used in the determination of things in a procedure 
analogous with the procedure of reason in the disjunctive 
syllogism. By the second case we refer to the rejection of 
the material condition in the hypothetical syllogism as a 
model for the unconditioned as ens realissimum. 17 In reading 
the two arguments one may wonder what Kant had in mind, for 
surely no syllogism's necessity would be mistaken for the 
absolute necessity of the ens realissirnum as it traditionally 
was conceived. 
One possibility is that Kant had in mind an architec-
tonic completeness, since Kant in the introduction to the 
18 Dialectic gave the syllogistic logical employment of reason 
as an example of pure reason as the "Seat of Transcendental 
Illusion 1119 • Such completeness is not to be discounted as a 
thematic format for the Dialectic especially in so far as 
Kant used his discussion of logical argument-forms as a 
13 
means of reference for one part of the Dialectic to another. 
Kant's general or introductory exposition of the Ideal of 
Pure Reason (i.e. the divine Ideal) makes use of that format 
as it anticipates his discussion of the Ontological argument. 
It is clear from the early part of the present Section 
[4] that Kant intended right along for us to realize the 
difficulty mentioned immediately above, that we ought not to 
mistake ontologically absolute necessity for logical necessity. 
That sort of mistake, Kant would have us realize, is the basis 
for an illusion presupposed by the Cartesian version of the 
ontological proof. His example here is the necessity of the 
Euclidian proposition, 
(1) Every triangle has three angles, 
which is assumed for the purpose of Kant's discussion as 
both an analytically necessary definition and as a theorem. 
As the latter we notice that any triangle is a con-
struct under the postulates of Euclid. Of course, under 
those postulates (1) is absolutely necessary in the sense 
that it is logically derived from those postulates and 
ordinary rules of formal logic. The necessity involved in 
this case is analytic, because the predicate belongs to the 
subject as something covertly contained in the subject's 
concept. Hence, the connection between the predicate and 
subject is thought through identity 20 • 
*But judgments following from postulates, theorems 
14 
and derivation rules, though they follow with unconditional 
necessity, have not the same absolute necessity as when we 
speak of the existence of a thing as absolutely necessary 21 • 
"The absolute necessity of the judgment is only the conditioned 
necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment •••• 1122 
So our proposition (1) did not assume that at l~ast one 
triangle is given as existing, and thus says nothing what-
ever about the existence of any thing, much less about the 
23 existence of three angles .* We may say the same of any 
truth, analytic or not, standing under (i.e. following from) 
any derivation schematism. Each theorem will be wholly sub-
ject to the truth of each of its predecessors, and be 
dependent on the correct use of derivation rules. In ·the cases 
of syllogistic inference Kant used in earlier sections of his 
Chapter, we may observe that the procedures of reason misled 
when taken as giving unconditionally necessary warrant 
that things are in existence as they are for logic. This is 
15 
not to say that some truths of logic cannot serve as truths 
of Metaphysics. The three so-called logical laws are often 
construed as ontological principles. Russe11 24, for example, 
has construed those principles to serve in this way. But 
Kant simply aimed to clarify the distinction between ontology 
and pure logic, which, as is often said, never supplied its 
premisses. No example of a purely logical relationship 
serves to establish any thing's existence in any way what-
soever, but that establishment depends on the truth of the 
premisses in a deduction (or, in the case of an immediate 
inference, on the truth of the original). 
To avoid this deluding influence 25 Kant wished us to 
examine the logic appropriate to any identical proposition, 
( 2) A = A. 
Assume that that thing known as concept A is supposed to 
exist. By the principle of identity, the predicate nominative 
of proposition (2), for example either the predicate of 
(3) Bachelors are unmarried males, 
or the 'three angles' of (1), must also exist ori this assumption 
of existential import for these three specified propositions. 
Or, to pur the matter another way, to deny the existence of 
any unmarried males is to deny the existence of any bachelors, 
16 
and conversely also, &c. But to reject the existence of both 
subject and predicate of · (1), (2), or (3) is necessarily 
a possibility; and to accept, for example, (1) that a triangle 
exists without the existence of three angles would be an 
absurdity. 
In this context, i.e. in generating the application 
of existential import to the identity principle, Kant 
reintroduced the concept of an absolutely necessary being 
as a topic under consideration. But that reintroduction 
is at least problematical. Kant's sentences, 
The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely 
necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we 
reject the thing itself with all its predicates ••• 26 
cause us to assume that Kant held all proper examples of the 
predication of attributes to 'God' are analytic predications, 
a view that may be at least troublesome to some. 
It may be firstly noted that all previous examples, 
(1), (2), and (3), were what grammarians call predicate 
nominatives. Kant's new exarnple 27 , 
(4) God is omnipotent, 
seems to differ from the others in the respect that 'omni-
potent' functions in (4) as a predicate adjective. Why 
17 
should we agree with Kant that (4) is similar in important 
respects with the other propositions we have enumerated and 
is, hence, a necessary judgment? Kant's example (4) would 
seem on Kant's own view of propositions and judgments to 
add an actually additional description of God, and in this 
case (4) may be nonanalytic since its predicate is not 
covertly contained in the concept of an absolutely necessary 
being as the latter was detailed in Kant's previous Sections. 
Without going further with our analysis, we may at least 
decide that if (4) is analytic, then no predication of God's 
attributes can be anything else. Now we ma~ constructively 
determine some defining predicate about God, as we shall 
see Ewing do in our formal consideration of the ontological 
argument, in a way such that the first premiss of the 
argument might be acceptably analytic. But it is hard to 
accept that an infinite being per se is omnipotent, and 
certainly some writers have thought otherwise. 28 Kant would 
be better off if he had gone right to the heart of the matter, 
and discussed the issue most clearly raised by the version of 
the ontological argument he considered, namely whether 'God 
exists' is an analytic proposition. He clouded the issue in 
18 
our judgment by proposing (4) as an analytic example, even 
if there was a normative metaphysical tradition being 
followed in this matter. For, as we shall see, the ontolog-
ical proof has less to do with the attributes of God than 
God's existence. At least Kant's discussion of (4) made 
clear that the subject of his consideration of the ontologi-
cal proof is a proposition and not the Ideal as a concept 
by itself, since 'analytic' must be the description of some 
proposition. If a proposition is Kant's subject here, that 
would rule out the possibility that we may interpret Kant 
as handling the scholastic version of the ontological proof, 
as we shall soon see. 
Under the assumption of the analytic necessity of (4), 
we proceed to a reprise of the application of the identity 
rule (supra) to the proposition Kant considered an identity, 
(4). *We cannot reject the _ omnipotence of God and maintain 
God's existence, and if we reject the existence of God we 
also reject, obviously, any predicate attributed to God and 
there is no contradiction in maintaining either of these 
propositions* 29. The conclusion Kant drew from the general 
discussion of identity, " ••• For I cannot form the least 
19 
concept of a thing which, should it be rejected with all its 
predicates, leaves behind a contradiction ••• " is itself valid 
only under the condition that its general subject is predi-
cation by identity. We shortly proceed to a particular 
identity, one Kant regarded as excluding existence from any 
concept whose mere possibility is still a topic for discussion. 
Existence shall not then be regarded for Kant as the same as 
omnipotence is with respect to God. Not only may Existence 
not be regarded as a proper predicate for any noumenon by the 
·noumenalist principle for Kant, it cannot be regarded as an 
analytical predicate, Kant will hold, of a mere possibility 30 • 
And that is the best sense we will be able to make of Kant's 
denial that being (Sein) may stand as a predicate 31 and 
Kant's affirmation that existential propositions are synthetic 32 • 
On to the ontological argument and its expression as a proof. 
Section V. Existence as a synthetic predicate. 
Previously we noted that what Kant attempted was a 
critique of the Cartesian ontological proof. While it may 
be that Kant attempted a more general project, it is by no 
means clear that Kant was even familiar with St. Anselm's 
version of the proof in its formal detail, although Kant's 
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text shows his awareness that that argument was an "innova-
tion of scholastic subtlety 11• 33 In this regard we briefly 
return to the subject of Plantinga's analysis of Anselm's 
argument. That analysis brings up the possibility that Kant 
failed partly because his procedure is directed to necessity 
of the peculiarly analytic sort, and thus is irrelevant to 
steps in Anselm's argument regarded by Anselm as necessary, 
but not necessarily analytic 34 • Plantinga's point merely 
serves, however, as a reminder to the expositor that any 
exposition of this Section of Kant's Dialectic should be 
pointed in the direction of one as subtle as any scholastic 
in his thought, i.e. Descartes. 
In this respect we may briefly review the discussion 
of identity as it motivated Descartes' formulation of .the 
argument under consideration: 
(5) " ••• [W)hen I imagine a triangle, it may be that no such 
figure exists anywhere outside my cogitationem, or has never 
existed; but there certainly exists its determinate nature 
(its essence, its form), which is unchangeable and eternal. 
This is no figment of rnine ••• 1135 
At the reading of Descartes' position one must recall Kant's 
attitude about the priority of epistemology over the doctrines 
and dogmas of metaphysicians ancient and modern. For Kant 
-
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ideas are mere abstract ideas, consistent with pure theoret-
ical reason, and that Kant's epistemological idealism reversed 
Greek realism on the topic of ideas with respect to theory. 
For we must now understand that what were for Greek philoso-
phy (e.g. nee-Platonism) known ultimately as the most real 
beings, God and eternal ideas, became under the Kantian 
theory of knowledge usurping Illusions and moral archetypes 
or analytic truths. All that Kant theoretically knew to be 
under the Category 'Reality' were actually appearances of 
unknowable things-in-themselves. Even though Kant will 
substantially ~everse his position in his discussion of the 
ideas' relation to pure practical reason as evidence for 
their reality, in the phase we now study Kant's theory-artic-
ulation is a thorough-going attempt to show precisely why, 
under his principles of knowledge, the above Ideal is 
unknowable as to its possible reference. Whether these 
startling results of this phase present themselves as 
attractive or rather persuasive with respect to the first 
principles of Kant's epistemology is important if we wish 
to consider those results as that by which we may ourselves 
evaluate that epistemology. However it is nothing more than 
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an irrelevance to accept or reject these results or episte-
mology by judging by counting the numbers of nineteenth and 
twentieth century thinkers committed to some form of idealism 
or, more recently, to Kant's particularly negative results 
in this present phase of the Dialectic. Head-counting never 
informs as to the truth of a single sentence. Whether any 
members of the philosophical community yield(ed) to Kant's 
epistemology on the basis of its expression or have at least 
been influenced by that expression is no indication as to 
the truth of that epistemology. To understand Kant's expres-
sion of his epistemology as the attempt to persuade adoption 
of its principles is not to judge it on whether it succeeded 
in persuading large numbers. Rather we ask if the epistemol-
ogy gives us reasons or evidence to accept it. We discuss 
some problems with its main principles in the concluding 
Chapter. 
We may paraphrase (5) to say that for Descartes' 
philosophy the essence 'triangle' existed as an Eternal Idea. 
In this proposition for the triangle to have an essence was 
for it to exist as an essence, hence 'the essential triangle 
exists' i s an analytical proposition for Descartes due to 
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his discovery of " ••• all the properties that I [Descartes] 
clearly and distinctly perceive the object to have ••• 1136 in 
his mere ability to elicit its idea, its concept. 37 On that 
foundation Descartes gave voice to a similar argument by 
which the existence of God might be proved 38 : 
(6) "I assuredly find in myself the idea of God--of a 
supremely perfect being ••• " 
(7) "I clearly and distinctly understand that everlasting 
existence belongs to [H]is nature ••• " 
Also, Descartes put the following in place to warrant (7): 
(8) " ••• [O]n more careful consideration it becomes obvious 
that existence can no more be taken away from the divine 
essence than the magnitude of its three angles together ••• 
can be taken away from the essence of a triangle •••• " 
These lead to the conclusion: 
(9) "So ••• I ought to hold the existence of God with at least 
the same degree of certainty as I have so far held mathemati-
cal truths." 
Kant's version of this argument, while not precisely the 
same, is similar 39 : 
(10) " ••• [T]he concept of the~ realissimurn ••• possesses 
[by definition] all reality ••• and we are justified in assuming 
such a being is possible ••• " 
(11) " ••• Now ••• ' all reality' includes existence ••• " 
(12) " ••• [E]xistence is therefore contained in the concept 
of a thing [~ realissimurn] that is possible. If, then, 
this thing is rejected, the internal possibility of the thing 
is rejected--which is self-contradictory." 
-
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We find in the latter argument an obvious correspondence to 
the Cartesian argument. Proposition (12) corresponds to (9) 
taken in conjunction with (8); proposition (11) corresponds 
to ( 7) ; and ( 10) to ( 6) • 
To avoid many mistakes, the clearer procedure is to 
discuss and evaluate Kant's critique of the Cartesian argu-
ment for it is demonstrably that latter argument Kant had 
in mind for his discussion of the necessity of analytic 
(identity) propositions which we already examined in this 
and the previous sections. The correspondence demonstrated 
immediately above gives further reason to proceed in the 
manner indicated. Of course Kant was interested in analytic 
necessity, we reply to Plantinga, since the Cartesian argu-
ment he referred to was grounded in analytic necessity. It 
is merely a faulty view of history which contemns Kant's 
treatment of the ontological proof on the charge of irrele-
vance. 
Kant wished his reader to examine carefully Descartes' 
second premiss, (7) above. That premiss has two distinct 
parts, 'the idea (nature, essence, concept) of God ('all 
reality')' and 'existence'. The second premiss may be 
--
described as an existential proposition, since one of its 
elements is 'existence'. Now Kant's question is, Is (7) 
analytic or synthetic? 
25 
*We may attempt to answer this question in at least 
two ways. One way is to examine the subject of the proposi-
tion, to see if it meets the test of analyticity laid down40 , 
to see if the subject-concept covertly contains the predicate. 
But in order to accomplish this examination of the subject-con-
cept we must decide what we mean by it. If on the one hand 
we mean [by the 'ideal of God' ('all reality')] to denote 
an actual being, then, 
(13) 'the concept (idea of) "God" ("all reality") includes 
existence (or existence belongs to it)' 
is a "miserable tautology" 41 • If on the other hand (10) " ••• we 
are justified in assuming such a being is possible" 42 , then, by 
the rule of identity-application established above, if we 
accept (11) or (7) we must accept that God's existence, or 
rather the existence of a being denoted by the concept 'God', 
is a mere possibility. But since we denote by that concept 
either an actual or a possible being, by the rule of identity 
God's existence is accorded only the same actuality or pos-
sibility as is accorded to his concept, and the proof has 
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proved nothing since (11) and (7) must be regarded merely as 
attempts to smuggle existence into the possibility of an 
Ideal whose existence is unknowable. 
*Another way to answer the question is to ask about 
all existential propositions if they should all be classified 
as analytic or synthetic. To say of such propositions that 
they are synthetic 43 is at the same moment to deny (7), (8), 
(11), and (13), for each named proposition either asserts an 
analytic necessity for including existence within a 
subject-concept, or warrants such an inclusion.* 
Perhaps we will better understand the arguments of 
Kant if we ask what he thought the ontological argument in 
its Cartesian formulation accomplished • . Kant thought that 
if 'God exists' were included in the concept 'God', then to 
hold that (9) God's existence is as certain as the proposition 
(1) 'every triangle has three angles' is to hold nothing 
important at all, since to posit God's existence as a premiss 
and to accept that premiss as a premiss in an argument designed 
to demonstrate itself as a sound conclusion is to do nothing 
but commit the fallacy of arguing in a circle. As such Kant 
regarded Descartes' ontological proof as an attempt to extend 
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empirico-mathematical theory beyond the theoretical use for 
which it was intended. We could not accept (7) and (11) 
as truths if at the same time we hold that (6) and ·(9) are 
naming a possible Ideal and not an actually knowable Ideal. 
For Kant there is no contradiction remaining if we deny a 
thing's existence so long as we deny the defining attributes 
found within the concept of that thing: just as there is 
no contradiction if we deny existence to the three angles 
and the triangle of (1), Kant's counter argument to (8) has 
it that there is no contradiction if we deny God's existence 
along with his attributes. 
But there are important differences between denying 
the existence of a geometrical triangle and denying God's 
existence. Merely because Descartes construed (1) as 
essentially similar to (7) is no reason that we must do the 
same. Perhaps the two propositions may be similar in some 
respects, but they are by no means the same in form. (7) 
describes only one essence whereas (1) describes many possible 
ipstantiations of an essence, or, in Kant's language, idea. 
Even Kant held that the ideas are different from the Ideal. 
We should say that it was Anselm who first noticed the 




difference between just any sort of concept and the concept 
'God'. Obviously there is only one Being than which a 
greater could not be conceived, and to this concept Kant had 
no reply since he did not address himself to it. Descartes 
and Kant, if they were aware of Anselm's position, may both 
be held responsible for fogging over this important difference 
between the many concepts and the single, or in Kant's word, 
actual Ideal, the most real Being, of which there could by 
definition be only one. 
Hence, Anselm's formulation of the Ideal as "that 
than which a greater cannot be conceived 1144 is by no means 
an analytic conception, since, as we mentioned above, only 
propositions may be analytic. While it is not open to us 
to debate in the present essay the necessity of Anselm's 
conception, it is fair at least to notice that a conception 
is not an analytic or any other proposition, and the possibil-
ity that to deny Anselm's conception is, as Anselm asserted, 
foolishness must rest on other considerations than those 
Kant adduced against Descartes' declarations. 
However Kant related to Anselm, we are now in position 
for some general observations about existence in Kant's 
---
theoretical philosophy. 
Section VI. General observation. 
Ewing's brief treatrnent 45 of Kant's version of the 
ontological proof helps us understand an interesting point 
about modern philosophy: 
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(14) "God, by definition= the sum of all positive attributes". 
(15) "Existence is a positive attribute". 
(16) "Therefore, God exists". 
Ewing briefly indicated that Kant denied (15) and in so 
doing laid down a logical principle that is admitted by 
most modern logicians. The principle of which Ewing wrote 
is that of existential import of universal propositions, 
which asserts that by a universal proposition nothing is 
known about the existence, in that assertion, of any partic-
ular named in the subject-class of its first term. We do 
not know, thus, whether our proposition (1) names any thing 
that exists, just as the proposition, 
(17) every unicorn has one horn, 
may be known not to name any particular existing unicorns, 
though it be true by definition. Once again we must assert 
that the principle of existential import does not apply to 
-
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a concept such as Anselm's, but applies only to propositions 
such as Descartes' proposition (8). We may go further and 
assert that Ewing's formulation differs substantially from 
Descartes' formulation, as may be observed by comparison of 
the two. As shall be observed immediately below, Kant did 
certainly not deny that (15) existence is a positive attribute, 
and so Ewing failed to get at the root of Kant's complaint 
against (16) God exists. 
Section VII. Second General Observation. 
Kant wrote that 'being' is not a real predicate in 
the sense that it adds anything whatsoever to a concept 46 • 
Thus, proposition (16) only suggests a relation between a 
concept and a thing corresponding to that concept, and is 
no predicate, Kant thought 47 • We observed previously that 
for Kant all existential propositions are synthetic. If 
no existential proposition adds any thing to the concept, 
how can existential propositions be synthetic? Kant appears 
to have used the truth of 'all existential propositions 
are synthetic' to deny that existence may ever be given to 
the concept of the subject of an analytical proposition 
alone, but he affirmed it must be given to both subject and 
--
predicate by the application of the rule of identity, or 
withheld from both by that same rule. In this way Kant 
denied, as we said, propositions (7), (8), (11) and (13). 
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The problem is whether or not Kant contradicted himself in 
holding 'x exists• · is both synthetic (adds something new to 
the concept 'x') and that 'exists' is only a formal predicate 
which could not add any thing to the concept 'x'. 
Schaffer believed 48 that Kant did contradict himself 
at this point. The only possibility which may serve Kant 
would be to suppose that 'x exists' (where 'x' is a noumenon) 
is somehow outside the analytic/synthetic distinction alto-
gether. We do not mean to deny that there are existential 
propositions. But we may want to review Kant's argument in 
Section V, above, as a form of destructive dilemma. If (11) 
or (7) is analytical, it must be rejected since, by the 
application of the rule of identity it would constitute an 
attempt to smuggle 'existence' into the subject-concept of 
(10). If (11) or (7) were synthetic or somehow construed as 
synthetic, then (8), (9) and (12) must be rejected since 
the conclusions they draw are only acceptable if (11) or (7) 
is an analytic proposition. Now no reasonable persons will 
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allow the smuggling of existence into the concept of mere 
possibility, and no reasonable persons will accept (8), (9) 
and (12) when (7) or (11) is taken to be synthetic. Hence, 
(11) or (7) is acceptable neither as synthetic or analytic, 
and existential propositions with noumenal subjects are never 
acceptable since they are nothing but logical (formal) predi-
cations and cannot determine any thing in any way whatsoever. 
The analytic/synthetic distinction applied only to " ••• all 
judgments in which the relation of a subject to a predicate 
is thought 1149• But if such a relation cannot be known, the 
distinction may not be applicable under this condition. If 
in some case existence may not be knowable as a predicate, 
then no such relation is known to exist. 
But that attempt to save Kant's views on existence 
is limited in scope to the problem of possible noumenal 
existence, and is further limited to apply to Descartes' 
view that God's necessary existence is construed as analytic 
necessity. It is clear, however, from the following remarks 
that we must in the context of Kant's epistemology seek a 
reconciliation between the proposition that 'all existential 
propositions are synthetic' and the proposition that '"being" 
n 
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is not a real predicate' before they will properly cohere. 
For if each is a general statement applicable to all predi-
cations, there is a genuine contradiction between them. 
Hence, we shall hold that the former applies only to proposi-
tions whose subjects are phenomenal and objective appearances, 
in Kant's terminology, and that we must abandon the general 
proposition that '"being" is not a real predicate' for the 
much more limited proposition that '"being" cannot be a real 
(i.e. knowable) predicate for noumenal concepts'. This 
demand of ours is not made in a vacuum, but in an interpre-
tation of Kant's general epistemology and its limitation of 
the Categories to phenomena as a larger context and in the 
text of Kant's section as an immediate guide. For together 
these contextual sources demand that the reader not generalize 
these two apparently opposing principles beyond the system-
atic use Kant made of them, at least not in an essay devoted 
directly to an interpretation of that use. 
Kant clearly believed that Existence is a category. 
In the Table of Categories it is a Modality. In Kantian 
language Schaffer's problem reduces to a contradiction 
between the doctrine that Existence (Dasein) may serve as a 
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transcendental determining predicate in the~ priori knowl-
edge of phenomenal things (i.e. appearances) and the general 
doctrine that being (Sein) is not a real predicate at all. 
Only the former doctrine is _ generally coherent with Kant's 
Analytic, and not the latter. We must, however, follow and 
appeal to Kant's actual language in our exposition. 
The precise doctrine, and not the general one, that 
'"being" is not a real predicate' has been limited by Kant · 
to the condition that we are thinking of existence through 
the pure category alone 50 • For if we " ••• were dealing with 
an object of the senses, we could not confound the existence 
f th th . . h th f . 1151 . . h o e ing wit e mere concept o it.... since int at 
case its existence is thought of as part of experience or, 
rather, our knowledge of experience. It is only in dealing 
with objects of pure thought that we have no way of knowing 
their existence 52 • The problem with the Cartesian argument 
lies much deeper than in a denial of the analytic necessity 
of (7). Rather the problem with the argument is the illusion 
caused by the confusion of improperly applying a Category of 
kn 1 d h . 1 . 1 'b ' l ' t 53 owe ge tow at is mere ogica possi ii y and under 
-
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Kant's limitation of knowledge we are not permitted to know 
that (16) is true or that it is false. To adopt the afore-
said limitation on the doctrine that '"being" is not a real 
predicate' does force us to abandon Kant's second example of 
that doctrine, the hundred possible dollars 54 , since the con-
cept of the hundred dollars is not a noumenal concept. But 
it is possible to tell that the entire discussion from the 
second paragraph of p. B626 to the end of Kant's Section is 
feasible only under the limitative assumption we have observed 
in relation to Kant's doctrine, since it is much easier to 
remove a single example than to toss out of Kant's philosophy 
the important doctrine that Existence is a category for con-
tingent propositions and judgments. In this case we might 
revise Kant's example as though it were prefaced with the 
condition, "If we were talking about a phenomenal concept, 
such as a merchant and his cash accounts, it would only 
be acceptable for his books to show a hundred real dollars as 
added to those accounts, and not a hundred possible dollars •••• But 
'God' is a noumenal concept ••• " But this plausible paraphrase 
is only another way of asking the reader that time-honored 
question if he would not rather have a real apple than a 
-
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possible one. The reader may in any case judge for himself 
the intuitive plausibility of Kant's proposition that, as 
we read it, 'all contingent existential propositions are 
synthetic'. 
On our interpretation the specific illusion Kant saw 
involved the ontological argument in the misapplication of 
the category Existence to noumenal knowledge 0£ the Ideal, 
and in this way its discovery reflected Kant's general pur-
poses in the Dialectic. The reason Kant gave that he could 
not put an end to Descartes' ontological argument directly 55 
was that its actual error was to go outside the analytic/syn-
thetic distinction altogether by exceeding the Kantian limi-
tation on sense-knowledge as the destructive dilemma (above) 
indicated it must. This conclusion invokes the ge~eral 
noumenalist technique evolved above in its application to 
attempted knowledge of an object reified in a pure Category, 
in this case Existence. If so, our interpretation of Kant's 
Section [4] is unified in principle with our interpretation 
of Kant's Dialectic: both interpretations seize on the 
noumenalist principle as the main Motive of Kant's negativity 
towards traditional metaphysical dogma. Section 4 is, ~hus, 
a concrete example of Kant's limitative principle. Kant's 
conclusion .is that (7) as well as (16) is impossible to 
know; we cannot know that the Ideal contains existence in 
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its concept because the Ideal is a mere consistent possibility. 
So for a human knower to know that (7) is analytically neces-
sary is to go beyond what any human may know and to compre-
hend the analytical necessity of the divine Ideal. But the 
Cartesian argument loses all force if (7) is synthetic. 
Hence, under Kant's paradigm for knowledge, (7) must be 
abandoned. 
Both Ewing and Schaffer pin their interpretations on 
Kant's general doctrine that '"being" is not a real predicate'. 
While Ewing is correc t 56 that Kant denied (15), Kant must 
have done so in the limited manner we suggested. For unless 
we interpret Kant as limiting synthetic existential proposi-
tions to phenomenal · contingencies and as limiting '"being" is 
not a real predicate' to noumenal existence, a clear contra-
diction arises, as we said, in his philosophy; and in that 
respect we are in agreement with Schaffer. If the latter is 
a general truth, then Existence may not be employed as a 
synthetic~ priori category. If the former were a general 
-
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truth, then Existence might be able to overstep its bounds 
and be noumenally knowable. As regards Schaffer's actual 
conclusion that Kant did contradict himself, his whole 
argument founders on his admitted failure to consider Kant's 
attack as an attack on the premisses of some version of the 
ontological proof. Schaffer's argument 57 missed the context 
of Kant's rejection of (15) and in this way found in Kant a 
much too obvious self-contradiction. 
It may be objected that the interpretation put forward 
here is too readily persuaded by Kant's qualifications which 
limit his doctrine about 'being' being a real predicate. It 
is true, after all, that as it stands in Kant's text by 
itself, that doctrine is a general and not a particular or less 
general proposition. But we cannot ask Kant for our sakes as 
his readers to avoid every perplexity. A reader must demand 
for his understanding the context of so difficult a proposi-
tion as that under consideration, and must not be misled by 
his own purposes, as Schaffer was by his, to find single pas-
sages which, when torn from their contexts, yield apparent 
t d . t ' 58 con ra ic ions • As Kant himself said, a philosophical 
treatise cannot be armed at all points. 
---
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If our interpretation is correct then to reject the 
Cartesian ontological argument on Kantian grounds in mainly 
dependent on an acceptance of Kant's epistemology and its 
derivative principles. The phenomenal/noumenal distinction, 
the limitation Kant placed on Category application, the view 
that 'God' connotes a supersensible possibility, are all 
presuppositions of Kant's attack on the Cartesian ontological 
argument. 
Before leaving the ontological argument we place one 
further limitation on Kant's discussion in light of the 
foregoing • . For all those presuppositions all that we may 
gain is the destruction of a single version of that argument. 
Kant did not deny that a necessarily existent~ realissimum 
could be thought to exist; he only denied that under his 
presuppositions such a being could be known in the sense of 
the justification acceptable to Kant for any propositions in 
the field of sensibility 59 • Such a Being is not impossible, 
hence it is possible. This point is not in least mitigated 
by the virtual disappearance of any sort of idealism from 
recent philosophy; since there are few if any philosophers 
who accept Kant's version of the idealist paradigm, the 
40 
entire question of the ontological argument must be taken 
up again (in some other essay than this), in order to con-
sider Anselm's formulation, it would seem, and not be rejec-
ted wholesale on the ground that Kant refuted it. 
In any case we must not extend the limits of our 
exposition to discuss the problem, in general, of What 
Existence Is. While Moore, Bennett, Heidegger, et al have 
all tried at this problem, the humble deference of Lewis 
Carroll seems rather more appropriate: 
••• [T]he difficulties of the "Five Liars" Problem ••• 
are "trifles, light as air" compared with the 
bewildering question "What is a Thing? 1160 
Kant's twin doctrines about existence may most cor-
rectly be interpreted as an attempt to establish a general 
truth about the logic of existential propositions, as we have 
shown. But each doctrine must have been proposed as a limited 
one. For we must not accept that for Kant 'being' is generally 
not a real predicate lest we destroy that most basic principle 
of his philosophy, that percepts without synthetic concepts 
are blind. For Kant, Existence is also a pure concept and 
a constitutive category. Yet Kant sought in his Chapter to 
prohibit its theoretical extension to the noumenal. 
NOTES 
CHAPTER ONE 
1. Quotations referred to from this and others of Kant's 
works are paginated from the editions of Kant's opera pub-
lished by the Preussische Akademie der Wissensch~ 
(Berlin: 1902 - ) and the abbr~viations for each work 
found in the Bibliography below. Hereafter the translator 
will be named along with the standard abbreviation of the 
particular volume's title only in the first mention of a 
particular work. Full documentation of the translator's 
publication is also included in that first mention. Itali-
cization for emphasis and punctuation will be mentioned 
only if they differ from that of the first-mentioned trans-
lator. With reference to the following, A precedes first 
edition and B precedes second edition pagination as is stan-
dard in scholarly references to that work. Immanuel Kant, 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV), trans. by Norman Kemp 
Smith as Kant's Critique of~ Reason (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1965), A567=B596. 
2. KrV, A589=B617. 
3. Alvin ~lantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Pr., 1967)--;--chapter 2, "The Ontological Argument (1)". 
Hereafter: Plantinga, God. 
4. KrV, B630. In fairness to Plantinga, he construed Kant's 
effort as an attempt to " ••• find a general refutation that 
applies to every version of the argument •••• " [God, op. cit., 
p. 27]. But a reductio ad absurdurn is distant from the dis-
covery of God's existencewithin an analysis of His nature. 
Both Plantinga's arrangement and discussion place Kant in 
opposition to Anselm's version; perhaps that is why Plantin-
ga's version of Anselm does not logically correspond to his 
interpretation of Kant. Since Kant may not have had acquain-
tence with Anselm's version it does not in any case seem fair 
to compare the two. Cf., infra., n. 34. 
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5. J. Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1974), p. 229 
6. A. C. Ewing, A Short Commentary~ Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1938), p. 241. 
Hereafter: Ewing, Commentary. As Ewing outlines the argu-
ment it is far closer to Descartes' formulation than to 
Anselm's. 
7. Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason (New York: -Humanities Press, 1950), pp. 52"s;° 529. 
8. Ding, Dasein, Existenz are all translated "existence" 
in the section, with Dasein occuring with the greater 
frequency. For example, all three occur on B625 as 
"existence" in Smith's translation. 




13. B620. Kant's explicit rejection of the correspondence 
theory of truth (B83: "the agreement of knowledge with its 
object") is relevant here. [In fact the whole debate about 
Kant's theory of truth between Brentano and Windleband is 
irrelevant, since for Kant's epistemology truth is 
category- or concept-dependent as it must be for any idealism]. 
14. B620. 
15. B604-5 and B616. 
16. B605. 
17. B616. 
18. B359-61. Bennett, op. cit., p. 258, pointed out that 
the attempt to found the architectonic on the forms of 
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inferential reasoning, " ••• is a clumsy attempt to rationalize 
a set of problems which reflect not the structure of reason 
but the preoccupations of German academic philosophers at the 
time Kant was writing. Where the theory has an effect, it is 
by tempting Kant into a brutal and insensitive forcing of his· 
material into unnatural shapes and never by genuinely illumin-
ating it." 





24. Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 72. 
2"5. Kant's words: ,, ••• die Macht der Illusion [der logische 
Notwendigkeit]" (the power of [logical necessity's] illusion) 
are even stronger. B622. 
26. B622-23. Kant assumption of the identity of divine 
predicates in their Notion (i.e. the Notion being the Ideal 
of Pure Reason) finds its origin in Kant's rationalist pred-
ecessors, and is the very foundation of the Cartesian argu-
_ment, that existence is a predicate already in the divine 
Notion. 
27. B623. 
28. For example, J. s. Mill, Theism (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mer-
ril Co., Inc., Library of Liberal Arts, 1957), pp. 77-78; and P. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
So long as reason, in its concepts, has in 
view simply the totality of conditions in the 
sensible world, and is considering what satisfac-
tion in this regard it can obtain for them, our 
ideas are at once transcendentai and cosmological. 
Immediately, however, the unconditioned ••• is posi-
ted in that which lies entirely outside the sensible 
world, and therefore outside all possible experience, 
the ideas become transcendent •••• detach[ing] them-
selves completely from experience, and mak[ing] for 
themselves objects for which experience supplies 
no material, and whose objective reality is not 
based on completion of the empirical series ••• Such 
transcendent ideas have a purely intelligible 
object; and this object may indeed be admitted as 
a transcendental object only if we likewise admit 
that ••• we have no knowledge in regard to it ••• 
--Immanuel Kant 
Section I. The Unconditioned. 
That Kant was possessed of a special care to discern 
the truth about the so-called Cosmological argument is clear 
not only from the aforementioned hints as to its peculiar 
cogency 1 should circumstances dictate a need to decide, 
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but is also evident from Kant's oft-repeated concern for a 
systematic and absolute unity in the universe. Kant's latter 
concern . becomes a deceptive Ideal, an Unconditioned which 
alone halts the infinite regress of the series of causal 
conditions, " ••• when we proceed to trace these conditions to 
their grounds •••• 112 
Without approaching yet the more difficult issues 
raised by any consideration of the cosmological argument, 
we take a preliminary look at Kant's view of its main infe~-
ence. The conditioned deceives us, Kant thought, in having 
us seek out in its contingency for the absolutely or uncon-
ditionally necessary in the sphere of pure reason 3 • From 
the outset the reader may anticipate that Kant's general 
approach to such a deception will be to attribute its 
extraordinary use of the concept Causality to the illegiti-
macy of the search for the Unconditioned in the Categories 
of Pure theoretical Reason. For the present case, the 
deceptive Categories are, then, Causality and, by extension, 
Necessity. 
To infer from the conditioned what is described as 
the Unconditioned is a natural as well as an illegitimate 
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inference, Kant indicated. Seeking unity is an important 
element in Natural science. However, to discuss the differ-
ence between the unity sought by the sciences and the unity 
sought by the cosmological argument is beyond our scope at 
the present. In Kant's language the former is a legitimate 
part of the scientific enterprise, but the latter is a decep-
tive illusion. Let us examine why. 
Just as the ontological argument Kant considered is -
of Cartesian origin, the cosmological argument he studied is 
Leibnizian. Leibniz' name is mentioned by Kant in connection 
with it 4 , and Kant's informal discussion of the tenets of the 
cosmological arguer in Section 3 (sixth para. 5) bear a close 
correspondence with Leibniz' version in his Monadology, 
paragraphs numbered 36 through 396 . 
Section II. Leibniz on Contingency. 
Aside from the main issue Kant raised against the argu-
ment, that it ascribes causality to an Unconditioned outside 
the series of causes and is therefore unknown as a (supreme) 
condition, Kant raised two other objections to the argument, 
objections not so clearly dependent on Kant's epistemological 
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views. Since these may be of wider interest to nonKantian 
readers, we devote space to them here. And, as they bear on 
epistemological issues important in their own right, these 
problems bear, as we shall see, on Kant's epistemology. One 
problem shall take us into the deep and sometimes darkened 
waters of contingency, and is the problem, Is there genuine 
contingency for the cosmological arguer? A second problem 
is suggested by Kant's approach, namely whether or not the 
Unconditioned is to be further identified than merely as the 
Unconditioned. It is better, since the second problem 
introduces some informal considerations, first to consider 
Kant's problem with the formal arcrument in its Leibnizian 
cloth. 
Kant's formal approach to . the cosmological argument 
goes like this: 
*(18) If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being 
must also exist. 




An absolutely necessary being exists. * 
Premiss (19) is a debatable point, --for skeptics, 
and Mahayanas it is debatable, at least if the ego is 
- -
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metaphysical and concrete unity, --but at present we shall 
assume that (19) is not at issue. It is, therefore, (18) 
which .is at issue, since the argument itself is structurally 
valid. It is the proponents of the cosmological argument 
who need to provide an account of the sufficiency of the 
Unconditioned, as Bennett noted 8 • 
Leibniz' defense of (18) is at once simple and 
problematic. The Monadology employed the language not of 
causality, but of conditionality, contingency, and necessity. 
The Metaphysics -of monads held that monads are interiorly 
determined. To touch on a point important to Leibniz, the 
nature of each monad, if not its existence, is determined 
by the principle of sufficient reason to be what it is and 
not otherwise 9 in the following way. While the opposite of 
a contingent truth about a monad is logically possible, 
each such truth is in principle discoverable in the notion 
of the monad's nature itself. That is, such a truth is 
analytic in Kant's sense, because it is covertly contained 
in the subject of its proposition. If men, with finite 
minds, cannot discover the truth in the notion of a 
particular monad, God can discover that truth by virtue of 
- - ---- ----------------~ 
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His capability of infinite analysis. Furthermore, the 
reader of the Monadology finds a clue there of great conse-
quence for the inference by the cosmological arguer to abso-
lute necessity. Among the various logically possible choices 
(i.e. contingencies) that He may attribute to each monad, 
God in His creative essence always chooses the best contingency 
for that monad and for the entire system of monads. The pos-
sibles that are best demand existencelO by their fitness to 
exist together with the web of antecedent and determining 
sufficient reasons 11 to allow the well-known best of all 
possible worlds to achieve actuality. 
If the reader will persist, it is a short step from 
the principles of sufficient reason and of the best to 
serious problems with the inference to absolute necessity. 
The demand of the best possibles to actuality among all 
possibles, along with the web of determining reasons " ••• deter-
mine [God] to select one [among an infinity of possible 
universes] rather than another. 1112 Such a position poses 
two problems. God seems to have no choice but to obey the 
principle of the best. Thus, God may be something less 
than omnipotent for a system which shuts off all other 
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possibilities than the best, and a traditional attribute of 
God may be missing. Of greater relevance to the problem of 
contingency is the following. 
If even God is not able to alter the determination of 
the world by the demand of the best for existence, can what 
was formerly supposed to be contingent be other than meta-
physically necessary? For Leibniz, it appears as if the 
answer to this question is No, and thus there is no contin-
gency in the system of monads. The problem may be stated 
as more directly relevant to the cosmological argument: 
each contingent truth is able to be analyzed by the divine 
Mind such that its necessity is evident to that Mind. The 
divine Mind is omniscient. Thus, each (apparently) contin-
gent truth is, in actuality, analytically true, and there-
fore necessary in an absolute sense, ab aliter. Hence, even 
if we suppose that it is legitimate to attempt the identifi-
cation of the "absolutely necessary being" (of proposition 
(20) of the present work), it should be evident that our 
only recourse in a system of absolutely necessary sufficient 
reasons is to come to understand that since no predicate 




(for Leibniz) the Notion of its subject or (more generally) 
from the system of antecedent determinations, it is inevitable 
that we should equate the absolutely necessary Being with 
each determining sufficient reason, and the reference of 
(20) is to each existent as it fulfills its role in the 
determination of each other existent. In that way, (20) 
would not refer to God, but its validity ·as a mediate infer-
ence could be made acceptable. 
But, some problems with this approach to the problem 
of contingency present themselves. To take them in order 
of importance--. Each sufficient determining reason is of 
an order or series. We may not, even in the Leibnizian sys-
tem, remove one of these conditions and name it first or the 
·unconditioned, that is, we may not of any particular say 
that it is first in the series, or what the cosmological 
arguer is aiming at. However it is in this sense alone that 
the cosmological argument seeks to find its inference to the 
absolutely necessary; if the latter is to be equated with 
the Unconditioned, it will not do to identify just any one 
among the series--we must grasp at the first. 
A contemporary cosmological arguer, Richard Taylor, 
-
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put forth the following argument from contingency, an argu-
which seems to allow for a genuine contingency and an 
uncaused Prime Mover. The sole way, that argument goes, to 
avoid an infinite regress of contingents is to discover the 
sufficient reason for the world as a whole in a Creator not 
ub . . h' . . . b · l3 s Ject to peris ing or corning into eing • '.!:'here is no 
difference in seeking a sufficient reason for a grain of 
sand or th~ whole universe, which may be thought of as 
dependent, logically speaking, on a Creator, as a certain 
light is dependent on a particular flame. 
Taylor's argument may be compared or contrasted with 
Kant's in the following way. If we were to seek the sufficient 
reason of the universe, we would, according to Kant, but be 
able to find whatever point in the series of sufficient 
reasons represents the state "before the universe". We are 
simply not entitled to seek something outside of (i.e. 
transcendent of) the system to explain the causes and effects 
of the system, since it is only through the system that we 
are entitled to say we can become acquainted with the con-
cept of sufficient reason in the first place. We have no 




the concept of causality is an unknown outside that by which 
we become acquainted with it. Leibniz' doctrines are an 
example of the strange and illusory beliefs fostered by the 
illegitimate inference to an Unconditioned cause--the Uncon-
ditioned, it turns out, is itself (somewhat inappropriately, 
we judge) determined or conditioned by the principle of the 
best. Returning to Taylor's argument, it furthermore becomes 
apparent that even if we were to suppose an unalterable Prime 
Mover as the First of a series of sufficient reasons for, 
say, the universe at 12:01 A.M. on a particular night, 
such a Prime Mover could not more be omnipotent (or at least 
known to be omnipotent) than was Leibniz' God, for the Mover 
would be determined by the unalterable truth that for any 
predicate P of that world Wat that time!_, E_ could not be 
shared by that world W with its opposite nonP. Either E_, 
that is, or nonE_ would have been true of world Wat time T. 
Such timeless truths as are produced by applications of the 
law of excluded middle are admitted by Taylor, but he did 
not seem to comprehend their significance for his argument. 
Their existence must, it would seem, forever determine the 
product of the sufficiency of the Prime Mover. These timeless 
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truths would seem to attain to a status of co-eternality 
with the Prime Mover. What would be logically prior to both 
would then be, not the truths themselves, but the principle 
of sufficient reason. Taylor himself writes of the theory he 
has devised that it represents an invincible fate; if the 
fate cannot be moved, then it cannot be moved by a Prime 
Mover--either the fate itself or its principle becomes the 
primary cause (similar to Leibnizian final causality, the 
principle of the best is a teleological principle), and the 
so-called Prime Mover a merely secondary cause or a primary 
cause obedient to some other, prior principle. Even the 
possibility that given there is the Prime Mover, cannot say 
ought of the character of that Prime Mover outside the sys-
tem of metaphysically necessary sufficient reasons. Such a 
given merely presupposes some sort of Unconditioned and does 
nothing to enlighten us as to its (or his) Nature. 
Furthermore, in such a situation as implied in 
Taylor's Metaphysics, if the principle of sufficiency or of 
excluded middle were the Unconditioned, and the Prime Mover 
in obedience to that principle, we may want to know who or 
what would be the upholder of that principle itself. This 
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problem gives rise to the classical objection, in that we 
would then embark on an unending search among an infinite 
regress of Upholders and principles, each speculatively and 
futilely seeking recognition as the true Unconditioned. 
[One could further speculate as to the genuine character 
(whether merciful and just and personal, or impersonal or 
misanthropic and just, or whatever) of the Prime Mover which, 
with apparent design and at least indirect causal responsi-
bility, allows for whatever end the horrible miseries visited 
upon so many. Such a speculative argument, in whatever 
direction advanced, simply exacerbates the mysterious or 
unknowable Nature of that Prime Mover, and in any case is 
more apropos to the physico-theological argument]. 
Thus, both Leibniz' .and Taylor's arguments seem 
inextricably bound to the conclusion that they fail to pro-
duce a suitably Unconditioned creator. The illusion of 
knowledge yields in those arguments a view of a world of 
impassible or predetermined truths about that world's 
constituents by which that Prime Mover, supposed to be the 
Unconditioned, operates. While it may be that other arguments 
produce a suitably unchanging Unconditioned responsible to 
no other principle than its own, and that these arguments 
also produce a genuine contingency without that genuine 
possibility of being otherwise in any way limiting the 
determining omnipotence of such an Unconditioned, it is 
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clear that the sort of argument with which Kant was familiar 
was unsuccessful in its attempt to produce a suitable candi-
date for nomination. 
Earlier we restricted our discussion of contingency 
viz. the determinations of sufficient reason and Leibniz' 
predicate-in-Notion principle to possible predicates. One 
way to attempt the saving of Leibniz' hypothesis is to sug-
gest (as some interpreters have it) that contingency might 
be based on the varying factual or material possibility for 
the instantiation of a particular existent, as suggested by 
14 E. M. Curl~y • Contingency would thus be rooted in God's 
choices between possible existents, and the infinite analyz-
ability of monadic essences is not enough to justify their 
contingency (such a conclusion militates against the conclu-
sion of Broad on the same subject). Such a position may have 
the merit of better distinguishing between the sort of 
natural necessity appropriate to the conditioned and the 
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superior status of the Unconditioned: it does not, regret-
tably, solve the problem of Contingency. For, taking into 
account the variation among possible individual existences, 
Leibniz still is committed by the well-known principle of 
the pre-established Harmony among existences to have God 
choose some individuals over others so that Harmony shall 
be preserved. Taylor's system is self-admittedly determined 
by the Fate of timeless truths, and in that way is still 
closed. Thus, it appears as if the so-called Unconditioned 
creator or god of the cosmological arguer cannot have its 
(his) own way in those matters and is, therefore, conditioned 
in a way inappropriate to the Omnipotent creator of all. 
Section III. Identification as an objection. 
What is more, to return to the exposition of Kant, 
the absolutely necessary being could never be identified as 
the God presumably desired by the cosmological arguer. Such 
a God, goes Kant's objection, should at a minimum (although 
this essence could hardly be a minimal essence) be proved to 
be the ens realissimum. But, if the ontological argument 
be rejected, Kant objected that no such identification could 
ever hope to be known by natural theology. In such a 
case, if we cannot call the absolutely necessary being ens 
realissimurn, then the cosmological arguer's conclusion is 
worthless because it is irrelevant. Kant's objection here 
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is even more general than his objection to the sort of 
doctrine proposed by Leibniz · and Taylor. In fact, it might 
be insisted that it is just their problem that they are not 
able to examine the nature of the Unconditioned, and so are 
misled by their respective systems into thinking that the 
Unconditioned is, likewise to other objects of those systems, 
determined by the main principles of such systems when in 
truth it is inappropriate to attempt to go further than the 
modesty of Hume15--, i.e. the nature of the Unconditioned is 
so mysterious as to be unfathomable by natural theology. 
Such an objection as Kant's problem of identification, then, 
goes to the heart of an exposition of Kant's division between 
the appearances which we may know (along with their concepts 
in connection with the concepts' function in such knowledge) 
and the nournena behind the appearances, the existences of 
which we may merely think without contradiction (about which 
the truth, though it may appear ever so certain, must ·always 
from the theoretical standpoint remain objectively unknown, 
61 
or unfounded speculation). On this point we should care-
fully distinguish between Hume's view and Kant's, the differ-
ence being that for Kant it is possible from a moral stand-
point to think about and speak meaningfully of those noumenal 
entities which must always as regards their existence remain 
unknown from the theoretical standpoint, whereas for Hume 
that which is nonexperiential must remain a complete mystery 
for natural theology outside the possibility of divine 
revelation. Of the deeper epistemological differences 
between Hume and Kant it does not fall within our scope to 
discuss. 
Aside from the general objection to Kant's limitation 
of knowledge set out in our concluding Chapter, we may urge 
against Kant's general problem of identification on the 
following grounds. The cogency which, as we have said, Kant 
attributed to the cosmological argument as a natural means 
of persuasion weighs heavily against any possible mistake 
about the Being of (20). The argument cannot both be ·cogent 
and, by the same token, exceptionable. May there exist 
genuine doubt about the identity of the Unconditioned? --even 
Hume's Philo had no problem accepting that there is a God16 . 
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Hume's problem is simply that, without revelation, His nature 
is mysterious 17 • Such a problem does not preclude some 
understanding of the existence of an Unconditioned creator. 
It may seem therefore on first examination that Kant's prob-
lem of identification merely repeats his general criticism 
as to the theoretical unknowability of an existence corres-
ponding to reified concepts. 
Furthermore, the classical purveyors of the cosmologi-
cal argument in various forms, as well as other theistic 
arguers, frequently argue in a context, such as theology, 
or a tone, such as prayer, in which the argument's purpose 
[and thus the identity of (20)] is unquestioned. Those 
contexts and tones suggest some other purposes and meanings, 
so our objector may continue, such as, for ex~ple, strengthen-
ing the beliefs of those who already are devotees of a partic-
ular belief system. From the view of our objector, it is 
only modern philosophy ~hat treats theological proof as it 
does geometrical proof. Thus, it was only Kant and his 
predecessors who chose to present the argument stripped of 
such a context as may be appropriate and to examine the 
argument, as Kant did, independently of any religious 
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authority beyond the human intellect 18 • We may not demand 
of such an argument as a theistic one anything more than its 
original context warranted; learning from such an argument 
may not demand that we be able to develop the meaning 
appropriate to its terms~ nihilo, i.e. outside of any 
context. Kant's general approach is therfore limited by 
the appropriateness of formal examination of what way be 
less than an independently verifiable argument. 
It is only under the formal conditions proposed that 
(20) needs identification at all. But, as Kant did not 
argue in a vacuum, he can hardly be faulted for replying to 
the argument as he found it. Under those conditions, then, 
the problem of identification may be somewhat justified, 
that is, as Kant shared the presuppositions of the Enlighten-
ment is this respect. 
It may be helpful at this point to examine the view 
of Bennett, since his view most closely resembles Kant's 
own on the objection that the cosmological arguer needs the 
~ priori argument to establish the identity of the being 
described in (20). According to Bennett, Kant's position 
is more extreme than Bennett's own. Kant's position implied, 
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again according to Bennett's account, " ••• that the cosmologi-
cal arguer gets from 'necessary being' to•~ realissimum' 
by means of the ontological argument •••• 1119 Bennett's more 
moderate position commits the cosmological arguer only to 
admitting the ontological argument's validity: if the latter 
. . 1 . d ' h 1 · 1 f 20 is inva i, so is t e cosmo ogica proo 
Bennett believed that the moderate position has as a 
strength that it makes the existence of the~ realissimum 
a hypothetical possibility. Now, Bennett proposed, Kant's 
attack on the cosmological argument fails to deny that 
possibility; and this Kant is willing to allow. 
But, Bennett himself comes to conceive for the latter 
argument what he thinks to be a more radical difficulty, 
that Leibniz' conclusion is "logically cankered" when it is 
made out that the Being named in (20) is one to whose essence 
belonged existence 21 • Of course, Bennett claims, this is 
the criticism for which Kant has been poised throughout the 
Chapter. But if it is the case that Bennett's criticism of 
Leibniz is in specific the same as Kant's, Bennett's witting 
empathy with Kant is less than helpful in examini~g how the 
cosmological argument depends on the ontological. Once again, 
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one may observe, problems in relation to the identification 
of the Being of (20) are serious if the argument is considered 
by itself; the ontological argument is not necessarily connected 
to the cosmological argument. If the cosmological argument 
is to be considered as a formal proof, then whatever problems 
it has may be shown on an internal basis for the examination 
of its premisses. It could hardly be established that the 
cosmological argument historically depends on the ontological--
although it should be admitted forthright that that argument 
is not adequate if it be considered without a context. Since 
Kant did not establish what is necessary to prove the con-
nection (except as he found it in his predecessors), and 
since he chose not to establish a context for the argument, 
the more general lack of identification is a more appropriate 
criticism, given Kant's epistemological views. 
Section IV. Kant's Dialectical Nest. 
Nearly to conclude Kant's Section, one observes that 
Kant's general principle discovers a nest of dialectical 
assumptions behind the cosmological argument, the first in 
the nest being simply human inadequacy to identify the 
Unconditioned as a cause in the sense in which we ordinarily 
-
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use the word 'cause'. Since this assumption follows directly 
from Kant's limitation . on knowledge, we press on to the 
second assumption in Kant's nest, although we pause to note 
that in this respect Kant's sentiments are frequently echoed 
by the empiricism of some of Kant's more recent epigoni. 
Kant's discovery of a second dialectical assumption 
presupposes that version of the cosmological argument which 
argues for a first Cause, in opposition to an infinite regress 
of causes. The First Cause argument, it might be objected, . 
proposes a primary Cause rather than a secondary cause of 
the world. However, at least one can see that the argument, 
formally examined, proposes that (20) must in seeking the 
Unconditioned entail the rejection of the principle that 
secondary causes are entirely responsible for the existence, 
not to mention the present character of the world. Such a 
rejection also seems to require of the cosmological arguer, 
as mentioned above, some account of the function of the 
Unconditioned with respect to the world--through final 
causality, or whatever. By Kant's limitation it would be 
impossible to furnish knowledge of any such function. 
Yet a third dialectical assumption is to be found in 
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Kant's metaphorical nest. Any version of the cosmological 
argument which attempts to complete the concept of a series 
of contingencies, including the two versions in this Chapter, 
in nonnatural necessity must, on . Kant's system of categories, 
give reason an "unjustified self-satisfaction 11 • 22 Such an 
attempt once again violates the limitation of knowledge 
categories, here Necessity, by a use strictly forbidden 
outside phenomena. 
Kant's fourth dialectical assumption follows in line 
as an attempt by the cosmological arguer transcendently to 
assume he may know what is only a logically possible transcen-
dental Ideal. It is quite clear that that assumption of the 
argument is only a dialectical and thus illegitimate assumption 
given Kant's limitation--and to get at the heart of the matter 
we must and shall discuss that limitation. 
At this point in the discussion what is clear con-
cerning Kant's position on the cosmological argument is 
that the objection most general is the most pertinent to 
the cosmological argument as a formal proof: the being 
described by (20) is unidentified without external help. 
However, that this general objection depends on Kant's 
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epistemology--in that it is Kant's limitation which questions 
the meaning of 'absolutely necessary being'--or on the 
presuppositions of Kant's predecessors--such as Leibniz--is 
also distinct from the considerations adduced in this Chapter. 
Kant has here grappled, if not always successfully, with 
some of the most difficult problems of Western philosophy, 
namely contingency, possibility, and necessity. He is not 
in any case to be blamed for any imposition on the reader 
of ambiguity or unclarity, which is more than may be said 
for many writers on these most difficult problems. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
In view of what has already been said, it is 
evident that we can count upon a quite easy and 
conclusive answer to this enquiry. For how can 
any experience ever be adequate to an idea? The 
peculiar nature of the latter consists just in the 
fact that no experience can ever be equal to it. 
The transcendental idea of a necessary and 
all-sufficient original being is so overwhelmingl y 
great, so high above everything empirical, the · 
latter being always conditioned, that it leaves 
us at a loss, partly because we can never find 
in experience material sufficient to satisfy such 
a concept, and partly because it is always in 
the sphere of the conditioned that we carry out 
our search, seeking there ever vainly for the 
unconditioned ••• 
--Immanuel Kant 
Section I . Physico-theological proof. 
We treat in the present Chapter of a possible sufficient 
Cause of the world's peculiar character. It should be obvious, 
after considerations advanced above as to the effect of Kant's 
limitation on the use of epistemological Categories, that 
Kant's limitation was applied by him to the so-called argument 
-
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from design. Thus, Kant's limitation apparently includes 
the three traditional arguments for the existence of an 
Object corresponding to the Ideal of Pure Reason. And, just 
as in the previous cases of the cosmological (contingency) 
and ontological (existence) arguments, it may be that there 
are important problems raised by the physico-theological 
argument as well--problems deserving of consideration in 
their own right. However, as indicated above, it is not 
always possible to persevere in the tracking down of such 
problems in the context of a relatively short work such as 
the present. Hence, although it may be desirable to come to 
some understanding of the meaning of, say, contingency, we 
may have to content ourselves at present with the analysis 
of some historical examples of, say, the inference from the 
contingent to the Unconditioned. 
One important problem raised throughout Kant's Chapter 
is his argument about other possible arguments for the 
existence of God. Kant's point is that, should the three 
traditional arguments fail, no other proof is a viable 
1 
candidate to show the existence of a divine Object. It is 
possible that Kant meant that, given his limitation on the 
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proper use of the Categories, no proof could pass the test 
of a sound demonstration of knowledge of divine existence. 
Or, it may simply be meant that all proofs available to 
Kant's inspection are subject to his limitation. We may 
want to know if Kant thought that all proofs of natural 
theology resolved into the three he exarnined--one might be 
able to offer strong arguments in defense of such a belief. 
Whatever one might want to do, it is the case that in an 
exposition of Kant we may consider as a legitimate part of 
the discussion those arguments Kant considered. To do 
otherwise is to take the unwarranted risk of anachronism. 
Kant, for example, seems not to have considered the reductio 
argument of Anselm, as noted above. But, if all theistic 
arguments reduce to a consideration of those Kant considered ·, 
then it would be possible that Kant's arguments are inclu-
sive of Anselm's argument. However, to solve the problem 
of the scope of Kant's Dialectic would require that each 
particular argument be examined, and such a project goes 
far beyond an exposition of Kant. 
In this Chapter it is appropriate mainly to consider 
the inference from Design as Kant found it, rather than the 
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larger problem of what inference from Design may or may not 
yield more (in one direction or the other) than the epistemo-
logically neutral status Kant came to with respect to all 
natural theology. In our next Chapter we shall have occasion 
to analyze the soundness of the latter in connection with 
its main warrant. 
We began our discussion of the physico-theological 
proof with Kant's limitation just because that is how Kant 
began his. *Since no experience can determine the Ideal of 
Pure Reason, as it is a pure concept, no experience could 
possibly be adequate to know the existence of an Object 
corresponding to that Idea1 2 • Though the physico-theological 
proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect, and Kant 
has no quarrel with its reasonableness or utility 3 , without 
any other support the argument's claims to apodeictic cer-
tainty cannot be approved*. Kant's assumption is here that 
we shall always be at a loss with respect to the concept 
of the nonexperiential. 
Thus, Kant's argument goes, if 'God' names a 'super-
sensible being, beyond our experience', then no experience 
could possibly serve to justify the inference from it to 
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such a being since that inference (as a formal inference 
considered by itself) seeks to build a bridge from common 
experience to the Ideal. Further, the argument from Design 
seeks to imply that God, as Designer, either stands at the 
beginning of the world as a direct cause of the nature of 
our world or that the principle of design represents some 
sort of final causality. With respect to these possible 
implications of the proof under consideration, Kant made 
the following rebuttal in the spirit of our previous Chapter. 
If God, as Designer, were some sort of Final Causality, then 
it would be evident that the argument stood convicted of 
the attempt to argue from experience to that which may not 
in principle be the subject of any experience--in which case 
the inference would be void of knowledge. If on the other 
hand the Designer had his hand directly in the web of causal-
ity, then we must, as Kant's discussion of the cosmological 
argument indicated, say that the Designer is bound (as were 
the Greek gods) by some higher principle, say, the principle 
of sufficient reason--hardly an impressive deity would that 
designer be. 
Before expressing any opinions about sources of the 
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argument Kant considered, we should say something of the 
traditional view of the argument from design. That proof 
speaks more to the nature of any deity than to the existence 
of such a deity as it may describe. If the world is what it 
appears to be, i.e. of a subtle, beautiful and orderly design, 
whose attributes share a similarity to an object of human 
artifice (all of which Kant recognized and appreciated), the 
designer of that world may share attributes with the human 
designer such as intelligence and aesthetic sense. But, 
that is all. There is no hint of any creation more than 
the formation of the world according to a design out of 
pre-existent matter. There is no Creator ex nihilo. Kant 
attributed to such an architect 4 the possibility of greatness, 
wisdom, and power 5--but no apodeictic certainty about the 
existence 6 of such an architect. 
Just as with the cosmological argument there are 
hints
7 
that Kant feels more for the argument than his formal 
consideration may allow for it. But, by itself, the proof 
cannot demonstrate any certainty concerning an origin (arche) 
of the material of the world 8 • 
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Section II. Sources, and the discussion of Kant's position. 
Little if anything is new in Kant's account of the 
argument. The argument itself may be found in Plato's 
Timaeus 9 • From that same source we discover the limitation 
f h lO th . h . f. th o t e argument , at its ows at most an arti icer ra er 
than a Creator~ nihilo, and the following statement: "Now 
that which is created must, as we affirm, of necessity be 
created by a cause. But the father and maker of all this 
universe is past finding out, and even if we found him, to 
. . . ,.11 
tell of him to all men would be impossible.... Kant has 
in no particular way added to or subtracted from Plato's 
treatment of the physico-theological argument, and Kant 
merely showed how that argument coheres with the limiting 
statements of his epistemological view. Our conclusion, 
thus, is that of Plato and most other users of the argument, 
that one ought not claim for it more than the argument itself 
allows. Not all evidence for God's existence is to be found 
in the argument, merely a piece of evidence. If one wished 
further to modify it, one may say that what the argument 
yields is in proportion to the evidence by which its infer-
ence is grounded~ posteriori. One may not call such a 
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resul .t 'knowledge' in even the weak sense of justified belief. 
Kant's limitation is here at its most reasonable--one may 
respect good evidence without arriving at apodeictic certainty. 
Such a conclusion need not demean the created world, which 
is of a genuine magnific .ence and grandeur. But in our exper-
ience of that world we may only find the sufficient reason 
for it in its design, and not the all-sufficient Origin of 
infinite character to which we may attribute that necessity 
proper to the sui generis supreme being. Such a conclusion 
does not, indeed, account for other, nonnatural data · of the 
world, such as moral responsibility in conjunction with design. 
But by itself the physico-theological proof presents no more 
than good evidence for some sort of design. 
Our expository sections have, thus far, examined 
three traditional arguments for God's existence in light of 
Kant !imitative principle in connection with all such 
arguments. We now make some observations above the nearness 
of the arguments in their formal detail, to fill in a few 
gaps of an expository nature. · First, it has not been con-
sidered how this part of Kant's Dialectic fits into its 
larger structure, except to make a brief comment on the 
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inadequacy of Kant's syllogistic outline. Kant's formal 
1 · 12 h' h h f cone usion to is C apter on t e Ideal o Pure Reason 
serves well enough given the structure of the present work. 
To seek for knowledge of the existence of God is beyond the 
capacity of theoretical epistemology. In truth we exceed 
that capacity when we seek such knowledge. However, by the 
same view, no one can claim to prove that he knows God does 
not exist. Such a claim would be as illegitimate as the 
claim of someone that he knows that God exists. 
Second, as mentioned in the Introduction to Chapter 
One, above, we are not in the present work discussing what 
Kant learned from his moral philosophy about the existence 
and character of the Ideal. Nor are we interested here in 
the positive aspects of Kant's so-called regulati~e Ideal 
in connection with the Dialectic. The reader should be 
assured that the neglect of both of these important issues 
has more to do with the self-imposed boundaries of the 
present study than with a desire to ignore issues so rele-
vant to Kant's topic. The reader may gain some hints of 
. Kant's views within the context of his mostly negative 
discussion of the traditional arguments; furthermore, there 
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is much to be said for a study of the neglected Sections 
at the beginning of Kant's Chapter on the Ideal. Kant's 
moral philosophy also had much influence over his seminal 
discussion of method in the concluding part of the critique 
of Pure Reason. One need go no farther than that Critique 
itself, in other words, to discover passages in direct 
contradiction to those who claim that Kant's views, on this 
interpretation, about the traditi _onal arguments were wholly 
negative, and that his positive comments were a sop to the 
censors or to Kant's favored manservant (per Heine). 
Third, and most important: as one may discover by a 
reading of Kant's general comments, Kant's limitation on 
knowledge is the price one must pay for accepting his views 
on the arguments. We shortly discern a specific problem 
with respect to that limitation . However, even granting 
the limitation, one must say that we have not .either pene-
trated all arguments for God's existence or gone very far 
into an analysis of the main problems presented by those 
Kant did consider. Kant, despite assertions to the contrary, 
has not decided the problems of existence or of contingency. 
In this respect Kant's desire to present a unified system 
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may have robbed him of the opportunity to analyze the content 13 
of his concepts or categories to the same degree that he 
analyzed their relation to theoretical knowledge. For 
example, existence is much more than a perceptual category, 
although it may be a perceptual category. Nor, we may 
observe, did Kant come to grips with Anselm's argument, if 
he knew of its existence. Problems such a raised here may 
resist analysis. Hence, it should not be surprising if the 
reader may be disappointed at the outcome of Kant's discus-
sion of the traditional arguments. If one does not want to 
pay the price of Kant's epistemological limitation, one 
may not have learned much about the arguments except the 
sticky nature of the intrinsic problems they present. What 
is called for in this case is the persistent attempt to 
resolve these problems by whatever techniques, whether 
analysis or some other means, may resolve them. It is 
hoped that some of the analyses offered above have begun 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
To know an object I must be able to prove 
its possibility, either from its actuality as 
attested by experience or a priori by means of 
reason. But I can think whatever I please, 
provided only that I do not contradict myself, 
that is, provided that my concept is a possible 
thought. This suffices for the possibility of 
the concept, even though I may not be able to 
answer for there being, in the sum of all 
possibilities, an object corresponding to it. 
But something more is required before I can 
ascribe to such a concept objective validity, 
that is, real possibility; the former possibility 
is merely logical. This something more need not, 
however, be sought in the theoretical sources of 
knowledge; it may lie in those that are practical. 
--Immanuel Kant 
Section I. General Critical Discussion (I). 
Kant's discussion of three theoretical arguments for 
God's existence taught us something about the structure of 
those arguments with respect to their dependence on the 
formal and foundational presuppositions of the early modern 
philosophies by which they received statement. However, 
Kant's discussion to an even greater extent relied on one 
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major presupposition of his own epistemology, the limitation 
of the Categories' application to sensible intuitions. Due 
to the latter reliance one is constrained to evaluate the 
epistemological limitation which is the source of Kant's 
treatment of the arguments. That is, it is Kant's epistemo-
logical principle which gave rise to his theoretical criticism 
of the arguments. 
We first examine, briefly, the logical status of 
Kant's principle before examining the principle itself. The 
principle of limitation, as Kant conceived it, is Transcen-
dental in the sense that it concerns knowledge of our mode 
of knowledge of objects " ••• insofar as this mode of knowl-
edge is to be possible~ priori •••• 111 Kant here proposed 
that epistemology is both a priori in its endeavor to know 
the workings of pure reason (i.P-. in that epistemology does 
not consist in statements about natural objects) and~ priori 
in that its rules cannot be empirically verified. In these 
senses Kant's use of Transcendental is very close to the 
current use of the word 'nonnaturalist' to designate certain 
recent varieties of metaethics and metaepistemology. Knowl-
edge of our mode of knowledge of objects is, thus, dissimilar 
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to the knowledge it purports to describe. Yet it claims to 
be knowledge of some sort and not opinion, belief, or some 
variety of probability. 
Analysis of the sort of knowledge-claims made for 
Kant's epistemology may not take us far into our study. We 
shall return to the theme at hand, however, in our particular 
examination of one such apparent knowledge-claim. At this 
stage it is worthwhile merely to reflect on the possibility 
that foundational rules or principles of a system are intended 
to find their justification in the system i tsel ·f as a sugges-
tion of the fruitfulness of those rules or principles. In 
this case it would not be expected that one prove the founda-
tion; rather the foundation is served by its system as the 
latter persuades of the correctness of the former. Having 
given some preliminary account of the status of Kant's 
epistemological presuppositions in general, let us examine 
one such principle. 
Can Kant justify his use of the principle that 
" ••• the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, have 
no kind of application, save only in regard to things which 
may be objects of possible experience ••• 112 with regard to 
the Ideal of pure reason? Mr Wittgenstein has given in a 
Preface a criterion of the drawing of such lirnits 3 : 
Thus the aim of [the Tractatus] is to 
draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to 
thought, but to the expression of thoughts: 
for in order to be able to draw a limit to 
thought, we should have to find both sides 
of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have 
to be able to think what cannot be thought). 
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It is quite clear that Kant's principle, quoted above, 
attempted to draw such a limit for knowledge. Thus, we may 
transfer Wittgenstein's criterion to the drawing of a limit 
for knowledge, and apply that criterion to Kant's system. 
If the noumenal realm is unknowable, as Kant's doctrines 
dictate that it must be, since its objects are not apprehended 
by the Categories of knowledge, how does Kant know that his 
Categories may not be known to apply? unless he has some 
knowledge and not mere thought about that realm. 
If we genuinely were not to know anything about things 
in themselves, we could never specify which rules do and 
which do not apply to them. There are four logical possibil-
ities. Kant ruled out the first of these, that we do not 
know that we know nothing: for if this were the case, then 
he could not have advanced his principle of limitation in 
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the first place, since that principle purports, in its 
limitation, to know that we know nothing, since it is a 
~ranscendental principle in the sense discussed above. The 
second possibility, that we do not know that we know some-
thing, is also ruled out by Kant, since he claims to limit 
absolutely our theoretical knowledge to the range of 
applicability of the Categories, i.e. to objects of possible 
experience. Again, since any transcendental claim is a 
claim of knowledge of our mode of knowledge, this second 
possibility could in no way but fail as it is not transcen-
dental. Also, as we have seen, Kant's assumption is that 
the object corresponding to the Ideal, if there is one, 
must be an unknowable noumenon. (This is so no , matter how 
strange it seems, in agreement with Hegel, to be unable to 
know absolute reality). Hence, the second of these logical 
possibilities does not describe Kant's position~ The third 
possibility, that we know that we do not know anything, 
seems best to represent Kant's principle, but is by Wittgen-
stein's criterion an impossibility. 
How could we know that we know nothing? Kant's sol-
ution to this problem is hardly satisfactory. Let us now 
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examine it in detail . In the beginning of the Section from 
which the above principle was quoted, the Section devoted to 
the "deduction" of that principle (Transcendental Deduction 
[in Bed.] of the Categories, sec. 22) and in Kant's Preface 
to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (quoted 
at the head of the present Chapter), Kant distinguished 
between thought and knowledge 4 • Knowledge is a spontaneous 5 
activity requiring two elements: the concept and the [sensi-
ble] intuition 6 of particulars. Kant's reason for this 
rf!!quirement is that if no i ntuition were given to a concept, 
then the concept would be empty of any thing, any object 7 • 
Obviously, Kant required a definition of 'object' at this 
point in his argument, in order to show that the latter 
reason is a good one. Kant's so-called definition, however, 
is circular, since he defined an object as " ••• that in the 
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is 
united. 118 Thus, the intuited object and the concept are 
referred for their meaning to one another in Kant's system. 
Kant also appealed to the "Aesthetic" to show that the 
only intuition possible to us is a sensible one 9 • But, of 
course: since the Aesthetic covers Kant's explanation of 
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space and time as forms of the intuition, it by definition 
must cover only the empirical. This however is no actual 
justification for Kant's requirement that we restrict knowl-
edge to empirical phenomena. Kant's concluding principle, 
quoted above, is in no way a deduced conclusion. Rather it 
is an assumption, and by Wittgenstein's criterion, an impos-
sible one. Kant's supposed limitation is therefore based on 
a circularity. Now the circularity of Kant's "deduction" of 
the limitation does not deny its appropriateness as an 
expression of Kant's epistemological division. What is more 
troubling about Kant's knowledge-limitation is, given its 
failure by impossibility, that Kant persisted in holding it. 
Kant's limitative principle knows what it professes not to 
know, that the category Limitation has an application outside 
objects of possible experience. If the noumenal as Kant's 
Absolute cannot be known but the phenomenal is the object of 
10 
knowledge, we say with Hegel that such " ••• knowledge, which 
by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, 
is nevertheless true--a position which, while calling itself 
fear of error, makes itself known rather as fear of the truth." 
The fourth possibility, that we know that we know some-
thing about the noumenal realm, is, of course, irrelevant 
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to an exposition of Kant's philosophy, since it is not an 
expression of Kant's opinion on the matter. It is, however, 
not a trivial one, since it is a genuine possibility; one, 
of course, which some philosophers would deny. This possibil-
ity qua possibility but demonstrates what a deep chasm there 
is between those philosophers and others who accept this 
possibility as a genuine one. 
Section II. General Critical Discusssion (II). 
Kant clearly demarcated a boundary between empirical 
theory--theoretical knowledge--and nonempirical things in 
. abl . . f d · ll themselves. To present a suit e criterion o emarcation 
Kant resorted to the notio~ of transcendental ideas as 
regulative ideas, such as the idea of cosmological unity, 
as appropriate for theoretical employment. While we may 
use these ideas for the purpose of consistent theoretical 
inquiry, it would be wrong to assume that we may know the 
correspondence between regulative _ideas and real objects. 
The same applies to the Ideal of Pure Reason. Thus, only 
regulative empirical employment is allowable for these ideas, 
according to Kant
12
• But, how do we know this? 
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Clearly the statement, 'only regulative employment 
is allowable for transcendental ideas', is not itself empir-
ical. Is it methodological? Probably Kant thought it is. 
If so, Kant's solution to (Popper•s 13 ) problem of drawing a 
demarcation between the empirical and the nonempirical is 
susceptible to the same criticism Popper applied 14 to the 
criterion of verification: that the principle of verifica-
tion is not itself verifiable as a criterion of the meaning 
of statements. For the proposition that 'only regulative 
employment is allowable for transcendental ideas' designates 
or refers to a rule the subject-matter of which is not empir-
ical: in that sense it too is a regulative idea. Since the 
15 • -regulative Ideal (the concept 'God') is the result of our 
thinking through concepts (Categories) such as the necessity 
of systematic unity and a necessary cause for contingencies, 
and since Kant is satisfied if we only think Categories as 
rules and do not know them except as they are known in the 
act of bringing synthesis to the manifold of perception 16 , 
Kant clearly meant to hold that regulative ideas (insofar 
as the Categories also are regulative) are known only in 
their empirical and theoretical employment. 
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But this move only postpones the problem of demarca-
tion. For in this case also we must yet ask how Kant decided 
that regulative ideas, in general, and the regulative Ideal, 
in particular, are knowable only in their theoretical employ-
~ 
ment. Kant deduced the Categories according to their func-
tion as pure concepts of the understanding; Kant deduced the 
Ideal as a set of transcendental theological predicates 17 as 
it functions within the realm of empirical science as a neces-
sary assumption of such science is to function adequately. 
In each case if sensibility is blind 18 without reference to 
appropriate concepts of the understanding, those concepts 
themselves (whether characterized as 'understood' or 'known' 
makes no difference) must find some verification of reference 
somewhere, so to speak, outside sensibility if they are to 
be useable. That is, if our knowledge of regulative ideas 
cannot come from within empirical objects or be produced by 
sensibility, in the sense of our being able to explicate such 
rules or regulative ideas, it is legitimate to pose as a 
problem the source of Kant's knowledge of such rules or 
regulative ideas. No mere analysis of sensibility or its 
function in human understanding can produce a knowledge of 
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that which, by hypothesis, is above the sort of knowledge 
it characterizes. The problem, once again, resolves itself 
into a difficulty concerning the status of Kant's claim to 
know absolutely what is knowable only relatively in Kant's 
system. 
This criticism assumes as its subject matter that to 
which the Categories and other regulative ideas (incl. the 
Ideal) are supposed to apply, whereas in Section I we focussed 
on that to which Kant claimed the Categories were unable to 
be applied. Both the latter rule of inapplicability of con-
stitutive reference and former rule of correct Category 
application are claimed by Kant to arise out of (or be 
deduced from) the principle that concepts are put mere 
thoughts, and " ••• can become knowledge for us only in so 
far as the concept is related to objects of the se~ses ••• "19 
But this last principle, a principle of the concept of knowl-
edge, by no means arises from any objects of the senses: 
and by this principle Kant has failed to demarcate any know-
able boundary between empirical and nonempirical, since the 
boundary itself is nonempirical and cannot, by Kant's own 
definition, be known. 
Section III. Hypothetical Construction based on critical 
remarks. 
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If what is most important about some book is what is 
most influential in that book, then Kant's most important 
statement about the possibility of proving God's existence 
lies in his judgment that 'God exists' is epistemologically 
neutral. That is, even though the concept 'God' can become 
the subject of regulative transcendental predicates, " .•• its 
objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot 
be disproved, by merely speculative reason •• • • 1120 Or, to 
put the matter another way, Kant made the problem of demarca-
tion "the central problem of the theory of knowledge 11 • 21 
What we have attempted in the present Chapter to understand, 
if not appreciate, is the nature of the limitation on specula-
tive reason with respect to the objective reality of the 
transcendental Ideal, and the meaning of the boundary between 
the illegitimate and the proper use of Kant's regulative 
ideas. 
Such a result as Kant's may prove a happy consequence 
for some who hold a vested interest in neutralit y of this 
sort. Agnostics with respect to any ultimate Object of worship, 
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and also those who hold the search for truth in higher 
esteem than the truth itself, come immediately to mind. We 
have, however, attempted to show that Kant's division between 
knowledge and the Absolute is unsupported. Our criticism 
may or may not express anything important to those who find 
epistemology neutral in connection with the Absolute, but it 
is clear that the importance of the problem should not be 
denied. If we cannot know of any potential or actual relation 
between ourselves and the Absolute, then we may not be certain 
in an intelligible manner whether an Absolute exists or 
not. No matter how much you or I may dream of an Absolute, 
may wish for an Absolute (or against one), may remember an 
encounter with an Absolute or may believe in connection 
with morality that morality somehow demands an Absolute, for 
Kant the existence of an Absolute is not a theoretically 
decidable problem. One may decide that Kant's . views on the 
theory of knowledge are compelling or persuasive enough to 
be adopted; if his views were adopted the consequences of 
doing so should by now be clear. It is an unfortunate but 
clearly mandated limitation that we cannot go further in the 
present work towards an examination of Kant's Analytic. 
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One might however want to make a remark about the 
sort of warrant Kant offers for his epistemological theory. 
The aforementioned circularity with respect to Kant's limit 
on knowledge--or neutrality of knowledge regarding constitu-
tive objects relative to transcendental ideas--is not itself 
an objection to Kant's limitation, i f one finds the results 
of Kant's functional analy~is of theoretical understanding 
compelling or persuasive. The objection here is simply that 
such a limitation is made impossible by its own hypothesis. 
If we claim to know such a limitation as that which asks us 
to limit knowledge, we have violated that limit. If we do 
not claim to know it, what is the point of claiming that 
any truth at all inheres in the limitation? Our point is 
merely that any such limitation or demarcation of knowledge 
itself gives an account of epistemology which is logically 
cankered (to borrow Bennett's phrase) in the way suggested 
above . If the principle of limitation of knowledge is mis-
taken, then it is easy to see that Kant's discussion ·of the 
theoretical arguments for God's existence does but further 
involve the reader in waters already deep and muddied by 
confusion, and that we need to look elsewhere for a general 
principle of criticism for all such arguments. 
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employment", if regulative employment is nonconstitutive. 
13. Popper, Logic, loc. cit. 
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